I have been the Managing Editor of the Journal of Economic Perspectives since the first issue in Summer 1987. The JEP is published by the American Economic Association, which decided back in 2011–to my delight–that the journal would be freely available online, from the current issue all the way back to the first issue. You can download individual articles or entire issues, and it is available in various e-reader formats, too. Here, I’ll start with the Table of Contents for the just-released Winter 2025 isssue, which in the Taylor household is known as issue #151. Below that are abstracts and direct links for all of the papers. I plan to blog more specifically about some of the papers in the few weeks, as well.
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The 2023 Merger Guidelines and Beyond
“The 2023 Merger Guidelines and the Arc of Antitrust History,” by Daniel Francis
In 2023, the federal antitrust agencies rewrote the nation’s flagship merger policy document, as part of a broader “Neo-Brandeisian” effort to bring about a deep reform of the antitrust system. The result—the 2023 Merger Guidelines—has been highly controversial: celebrated by some as a revolutionary advance, and criticized by others as a step back toward a benighted past. This article evaluates the 2023 guidance against the arc of antitrust’s modern history. It argues that the new guidance breaks a long trend of migration from structure toward welfare as the primary orientation of merger enforcement, but that it does so cautiously, by achieving a fraught ambiguity between welfarist and nonwelfarist policies. In inviting both revolutionary and evolutionary readings, the agencies have sacrificed clarity and discouraged beneficial deals, but they have also deferred—at least for now—a sharp conflict between those who would preserve antitrust’s governing paradigm and those who would remake it.
“Improving Economic Analysis in Merger Guidelines,” by Louis Kaplow
Merger review should reflect basic precepts of decision analysis, best practices in industrial organization economics, and teachings from related fields. Unfortunately, the analytical methods in modern merger guidelines fall short. Protocols violate standard prescriptions for information collection and decision-making, rely on a market definition paradigm that deviates significantly from core models of competitive interaction, fail to leverage central advances in understanding the efficiency consequences of mergers, and contravene or ignore fundamental dynamics relating to entry. This article elaborates correct analysis and contrasts it with that embodied in modern merger guidelines generally employed throughout the developed world, including the 2023 Merger Guidelines revision in the United States.
“Acquisitions to Enter New Markets,” by Carl Shapiro
How should antitrust enforcers treat acquisitions by successful firms to enter new markets? Should a major pharmaceutical company with an extensive sales and distribution network be permitted to acquire a popular drug that does not compete against any of the drugs it already owns? Throughout American economic history, expansion by successful firms into new markets has played a vital role in promoting competition and spurring economic growth. However, acquisitions to enter new markets also can harm competition by enabling monopolists to enlarge their empires. The 2023 Merger Guidelines break new ground by announcing that the US antitrust agencies will challenge mergers and acquisitions that “could enable the merged firm to extend a dominant position from one market into a related market,” but they say very little about how such acquisitions will be evaluated. This article explains how antitrust enforcers can use economic evidence and theory to distinguish between acquisitions to enter new markets that are harmful and those that are beneficial.
The US Safety Net
“Two Histories of the Public Safety Net,” by Christopher Howard
Although poverty in the United States has declined over the last half century, it remains a serious problem. This article charts the historical development of the public safety net, starting with means-tested programs and then adding inclusive social insurance programs. Over time, programs targeted at people with low incomes gradually shifted from the local to the state to the national level. Nevertheless, they remained politically vulnerable as policymakers questioned the deservingness of recipients and often tried to limit cash welfare. Those concerns were less salient with inclusive programs like Social Security and Medicare, which expanded rapidly between 1950 and 1980, largely to the benefit of older Americans. The concluding section highlights recent trends that challenge the supposed weakness of means-tested programs and strength of inclusive programs.
” Did Welfare Reform End the Safety Net as We Knew It? The Record since 1996,” Lucie Schmidt, Lara Shore-Sheppard, and Tara Watson
This paper examines the evolution of the safety net for low-income families since welfare reform in 1996 promised to “end welfare as we know it”. The total package of supports has become substantially more generous, but has changed in character. Support has shifted away from monthly cash transfers towards tax credits and in-kind benefits, and has expanded for working families while declining for those without earnings. Resources available to married-parent families have expanded, whereas those for adults without dependents remain scant. We also document that, despite expanded state flexibilities, variability in generosity across states did not grow due to simultaneous expansions of federal food assistance and tax credits. Overall, these changes reflect ongoing contention over two key policy issues. First, what is the appropriate trade-off between promoting work versus preventing material hardship? Second, what is the appropriate role for states versus the federal government in determining safety net generosity?
“Administrative Burdens in the Social Safety Net,” Pamela Herd and Donald Moynihan
Administrative burdens shape people’s experiences of, and access to, social safety net programs. They can undermine the goals these programs are trying to achieve. Such burdens are the experience of policy implementation as onerous, and arise via learning costs (knowing about the existence of and requirements of public services), compliance costs (time and effort spent dealing with bureaucratic demands, such as paperwork and documentation), and psychological costs (emotional responses to citizen-state interactions). Such frictions can substantially limit eligible peoples’ access to public services they want, would benefit from, and are legally entitled to receive. Those with the fewest resources, and the greatest needs, may struggle more to overcome burdens; the frictions thereby reinforcing existing inequality. As a research approach, administrative burden offers an intuitive and accessible way for policy actors and researchers to improve state capacity and the delivery of public services.
Articles
“Getting Infrastructure Built: The Law and Economics of Permitting,” by Zachary Liscow
Given the benefits to economic growth and economic mobility, and the need to transition to green energy, getting infrastructure built is an urgent issue. I first review the evidence on the costs and benefits of the current regime of government approvals for such building: in the US, permitting is slow, infrastructure is expensive, and environmental outcomes are not particularly good. I propose a framework for reform with two dimensions: the power of the executive branch to decide and its capacity to plan. After considering reform possibilities, I propose that reforming both dimensions could lead to a possible “green bargain” that benefits efficiency, the environment, and democracy.
“A Practical Guide to Shift-Share Instruments,” by Kirill Borusyak, Peter Hull, and Xavier Jaravel
A recent econometric literature shows two distinct paths for identification with shift-share instruments, leveraging either many exogenous shifts or exogenous shares. We present the core logic of both paths and practical takeaways via simple checklists. A variety of empirical settings illustrate key points.
“Tax Privacy,” by Joel Slemrod
Implementing an equitable and efficient tax system requires that the government have access to certain information about taxpayers. If the demand for privacy implies limiting government’s access to relevant information, it constrains the extent to which a tax system can achieve these goals. In this way, demand for limiting government access to information imposes social costs. This article discusses the aspects of privacy that matter, including leaks, and explores certain countries’ public disclosure of taxpayer information. It then discusses what is known about, and the difficulties of ascertaining, how taxpayers value tax privacy, whether offering choices to taxpayers about information revelation can ease the tension between privacy and otherwise optimal tax policy, and uses the wealth tax as an example of the policy tradeoffs that arise.
“Philipp Strack, 2024 Clark Medalist,” by Drew Fudenberg
The 2024 John Bates Clark Medal of the American Economic Association was awarded to Philipp Strack, Professor of Economics at Yale University, for his pathbreaking contributions to the study of individual decision making, which have introduced new techniques, improved our understanding of important economic phenomena, and helped spark a new wave of research on the economics of information while building bridges between modern economic theory and a wide range of adjacent disciplines. This article summarizes some of Philipp’s papers, and explains how they build on and improve previous work.
“Recommendations for Further Reading,” by Timothy Taylor
