The GDP of North Korea was about $26 billion in 2024 (roughly equal to total sales for the Kraft Heinz Company), and with a population of about 26 million, that works out to a per capita GDP of (very) roughly $1,000 per year. However, that GDP estimate is not from any statistical release from the government of North Korea, which doesn’t do statistical releases. Instead, it’s from a report by the central bank of South Korea. Back in 2021, North Korea did send to the United Nations a report titled “Democratic People’s Republic of Korea Voluntary National Review on the Implementation of the 2030 Agenda. That report estimated a GDP of $33 billion in 2019–but without context on how that figure was derived.
How can one study an economy where government statistical data is unavailable or unreliable? Stephan Haggard, Kyoochul Kim, and Munseob Lee ask the question in “Studying economic black holes: Lessons from North Korea” (World Development, May 2026, 201: 107315). They discuss techniques of what they call “forensic economics.” “We focus on six sources of information: (i) data derived from remote sensing using satellites, (ii) information gleaned from periodic access by humanitarian agencies, (iii) `mirror statistics’ trade and aid data which relies on foreign partners rather than the government, (iv) information on prices collected surreptitiously, (v) information and data generated by refugee surveys and interviews, and (vi) creative use of official documents that unintentionally provide information that the government might actually seek to control.”
Perhaps the most famous illustration of satellite data for estimating GDP is from a 2014 NASA photo, which shows a view of “night lights” across South Korea, then the darkness over North Korea, and the night lights of China beyond. There has been active research seeking to infer GDP–and changes in GDP–from night lights and other satellite imagery. Haggard, Kim and Lee point out that South Korean central bank estimates of North Korea’s GDP are based on estimating output of key goods, like tons of steel or kilograms of rice, and then combining this with intelligence data. But of course, an estimate of GDP based on goods will miss the service sector. Apparently, South Korea’s estimates of North Korean GDP don’t show much increase in the last couple of decades, but estimates based on night lights do show a rise.
Estimates of agricultural output from satellite imagery can also be combined with data gathered from the UN Food and Agriculture Organization, when it is allowed to operate inside North Korea.
Estimates of North Korean trade patterns can be constructed from “mirror” statistics–that is, base on data from North Korea’s trading partners. China is by far the biggest trading partner for North Korea. The goods being traded can also offer insights into the underlying economy. For example, “the trend in the quality of Vietnam’s exported goods, measured in terms of human capital inputs, contrasts with that of North Korea. Vietnam’s exports have gradually shifted towards higher-quality goods, from rice and coffee to apparel and then electronics. In contrast, as diplomatic and military conflicts severed trade ties with Japan and South Korea in the late 2000s, North Korea expanded its trade with China, where economic growth fueled demand for fossil fuels. Consequently, North Korea’s anthracite coal exports surged, leading to a sharp increase in export volume but a decline in overall export quality. This suggests that North Korea’s heavy dependence on anthracite coal exports to China and reliance on other commodities could dampen long-run growth.”
Price data is considered a state secret in North Korea and “North Korea does not publish an official price index. Gathering pricing information from within North Korea requires the transfer of individuals or data across the country’s borders, at some risk to the participants given that the North Korean regime considers such data breaches as criminal and even capital offenses. However, complex information networks, relying on cell phones with the ability to connect to China, have allowed outside news organizations to put together consistent series of prices on basic commodities across multiple cities …”
Such data are sketchy, of course, but they pick up big patterns. This figure shows the price level in 2020 set equal to 100. As you can see, there was an extraordinary inflation between about 2010 and 2013, and then a milder inflation after 2020.
Surveys of refugees and defectors from North Korea are obviously not much help in estimating GDP, but they can offer detailed insight into particular industries–say, fishing–as well as day-to-day economic interactions.
Even official communications from the government of North Korea can offer insights, if cautiously digested. The authors explain:
North Korea is a particularly good example of an economic black hole because it publishes little if any usable economic data. However, authoritarian regimes do not simply stifle information; they use government-controlled media to communicate core messages to elites and to promote and legitimize their policies. The North Korean regime is no exception, and the array of such publications presents a potentially important field for the extraction of information, even if it requires careful reading; official news outlets; television broadcasts; speeches; and even academic journals reflect the government’s ideological stance and economic policies. In addition, the government publishes laws and regulations that pertain to economic activity and these have now been collated into accessible databases in English translation (North Korea Tech Lab, 202526). In general, the information available from these official North Korean sources has been underutilized by economists because it rarely provides the sorts of data that would be of direct interest to researchers. But recent advances in text mining through machine learning or so-called “text as data” approaches have enabled the conversion of qualitative data into quantitative data that opens up research opportunities.
North Korea is an extreme case of a black hole for economic data. But there are many countries around the world where estimates of GDP, or even basic estimates of population, can be quite uncertain. These tools of “forensic economics” have potentially much broader application.
