Administrators Take Over Academia

Some decades ago, institutions of higher education used to follow a philosophy of \”faculty governance,\” which was that the faculty of the school–especially the tenured faculty–took the lead in running the institution. But at many places, that philosophy has been on life-support for decades. Consider these comments from economist Barbara Bergmann from almost a quarter-century ago in 1991, when she was president of the American Association of University Professors (AAUP).

Undetected, unprotested, and unchecked, the excessive growth of administrative expenditures has done a lot of damage to life and learning on our campuses. On each campus that suffers from this disease, and most apparently do, millions of dollars have been swallowed up. Huge amounts have been devoted to funding administrative positions that a few years ago would have been thought unnecessary. If it were just a matter of the money wasted, that would be bad enough. But the bloating of college administrations over the past decades has made administrative performance worse rather than better. It has bogged us down in reels of time-consuming and despair-creating red tape. It has
fostered delusions of grandeur among some of the administrative higher-ups, whose egos have grown along with the size of the staffs under their supervision.

John W. Curtis and Saranna Thornton quote Bergmann in their recent essay \”Losing Focus: The Annual Report on the Status of the Profession, 2013-14,\” published in the March-April 2014 issue of Academe

(which is published by the AAUP). The essay has lots of detail about salary increases, the role of sports in the budgets of higher education, and more. Here, consider two figures. 
The first shows percentage change in number of employees at higher education institutions from from 1975-76 up to 2011. The U.S. government statistics are that the enrollment in post-secondary education was 8.8 million in Fall 1975, and 21.8 million in Fall 2013 (see Table 3 in this issue of the Digest of Education Statistics)–an increase in enrollments of about 150%. How did the higher education sector respond to this more-than-doubling of enrollment? Well, the part-time faculty rose by 286%, non-tenure-track full-time faculty rose by 259%, and full-time nonfaculty professionals rose by 369%, and full-time executives rose by 141%. Meanwhile, the full-time tenured and tenure-track faculty, who are theoretically at the heart of a philosophy of faculty governance, increased by 23%. 
As the share of tenured faculty members has fallen and the share of non-faculty employees of higher education has risen, pay raises have followed. This figure is divided into public and private schools, but the overall pattern is similar. The total pay raises for professors, associate professors and assistant professors from the late 1970s up to the present have lagged well behind the pay raises for those at the top of the administrative hierarchy. 
Institutions are made up of groups of people, and when some groups become relatively larger and better-paid than other groups, the balance of power in the institution shifts. Bergmann was already concerned about excessive growth of administration in higher education a quarter-century ago. Many faculty at institutions of higher education have been quite willing to hand over the reins of steering their institutions to non-faculty professionals, and instead to retreat to their research and their classrooms. Many administrators have been quite willing to take up those reins. The role of tenure-track faculty in higher education has diminished, and the role of administrators has increased. For those who would like more detail, a February 7, 2014, post with a similar theme is here

Expanding Apprenticeships

It\’s a commonplace of the education world that not all students learn the same way. Some learn by reading, some by conversation, some by writing notes. Some learn better as individuals; some do better in groups. And it\’s time for the U.S. to recognize that some would learn better if we got them out of the existing school system and involved in apprenticeships. Robert I. Lerman lays out the issues and possibilities in \”Expanding Apprenticeship Opportunities in the United States.\”

What Lerman means by \”apprenticeships\” are a program where in the last couple of years of high school, students would apply for a program where they would complete high school, and maybe get a few college credits, while taking classes but also working about 2,000 hours (that is, the equivalent of 50 weeks of 40 hour workweeks, spread over a couple of years). Here are some of Lerman\’s points that caught my eye (citations omitted):

\”Despite the well-documented high average returns to college, variations in interests, capacities, and learning styles suggest many young people would benefit far more from alternative pathways to rewarding careers than  they do from academic-only pathways. …

\”Today apprentices make up only 0.2 percent of the U.S. labor force, far less than in Canada (2.2 percent), Britain (2.7 percent), and Australia and Germany (3.7 percent). In addition, government spending on apprenticeship programs is tiny compared with spending by other countries and spending on less-effective career and community college systems that provide education and training for specific occupations. While total annual government funding for apprenticeship in the United States is only about $100 to $400 per apprentice, federal, state, and local annual government spending per participant
for two-year public colleges is approximately $11,400. Not only are government outlays sharply higher, but the cost differentials are even greater after accounting for the higher earnings (and associated taxes) of apprentices compared to college students. Given these data, at least some of the low apprenticeship penetration can be attributed to a lack of public effort in promoting and supporting apprenticeship and to heavy subsidies for alternatives to apprenticeship. …

\”Unlike programs in Austria, Germany, and Switzerland, the  apprenticeship system in the United States is almost entirely divorced from high schools and serves very few workers under the age of twenty-five. …

\”Only a few states, notably Georgia and Wisconsin, now operate youth apprenticeship programs that provide opportunities to youth ages sixteen to nineteen. State funding pays for coordinators in local school systems and sometimes for required courses not offered in high schools. In Georgia, 143 out of 195 school systems currently participate in the apprenticeship program, serving a total of 6,776 students. These apprentices engage in at least 2,000 hours of work-based earning, as well as 144 hours of related classroom instruction. The Wisconsin program includes one-year to two-year options for nearly 2,000 high school juniors and seniors, requiring from 450 to 900 hours in work-based learning and two to four related occupational courses. The program draws on industry skill standards and awards completers with a  Certificate of Occupational Proficiency in the relevant field. Some students also receive technical college academic credit. In Georgia, the industry sectors offering apprenticeship range  from business, marketing, and information management to health and human services and technology and engineering. The Wisconsin youth apprenticeship programs are in food and natural resources, architecture and construction, finance,  health sciences, tourism, information technology, distribution  and logistics, and manufacturing. …

Two studies of the earnings gains of apprentices and government costs in the United States find that the social benefits outweigh the social and government costs by ratios of 20:1 to 30:1 … 

Britain’s success in expanding apprenticeship positions from about 150,000 in 2007 to over 850,000 in 2013 offers one example for how to create successful national and decentralized marketing initiatives. …  Stimulating a sufficient increase in apprenticeship slots is the most important challenge. Although it is easy to cite examples  of employer reluctance to train, the evidence from South Carolina and Britain suggests that a sustained, business-oriented  marketing effort can persuade a large number of employers to participate in apprenticeship training. Both programs were able to more than quadruple apprenticeship offers over about five to six years. … Compared to expanding the demand for apprentices, increasing supply by attracting sufficient applicants for apprenticeship is likely to be relatively easy.

For previous posts on apprenticeships, see \”Apprenticeships for the U.S. Economy\” (October 18, 2011),  \”Taking Apprenticeships Seriously\” (February 18, 2013), and \”Apprenticeships: Connecting Young Adults to Jobs\” (September 11, 2013).

Lerman\’s proposal is one of 14 appearing in an e-book called Policies to Address Poverty in America, edited by Melissa S. Kearney and Benjamin H. Harris and published by the Hamilton Project at the Brookings Institution. Each policy proposal is written by an expert in the field, and while the proposal themselves are short and readable, the footnotes and citations are available for those who want a deeper dive. Here\’s the list of topics:

  • Proposal 1. Expanding Preschool Access For Disadvantaged Children 
  • Proposal 2. Addressing The Parenting Divide To Promote Early Childhood Development For Disadvantaged Children 
  • Proposal 3. Reducing Unintended Pregnancies For Low-Income Women 
  • Proposal 4. Designing Effective Mentoring Programs For Disadvantaged Youth 
  • Proposal 5. Expanding Summer Employment Opportunities For Low-Income Youth 
  • Proposal 6. Addressing the Academic Barriers To Higher Education 
  • Proposal 7. Expanding Apprenticeship Opportunities in the United States 
  • Proposal 8. Improving Employment Outcomes For Disadvantaged Students 
  • Proposal 9. Providing Disadvantaged Workers With Skills To Succeed in the Labor Market 
  • Proposal 10. Supporting Low-Income Workers Through Refundable Child-Care Credits 
  • Proposal 11. Building On The Success of the Earned Income Tax Credit 
  • Proposal 12. Encouraging Work Sharing To Reduce Unemployment 
  • Proposal 13. Designing Thoughtful Minimum Wage Policy at the State and Local Levels 
  • Proposal 14. Smarter, Better, Faster: The Potential For Predictive Analytics and Rapid-Cycle Evaluation To Improve Program Development And Outcomes 

Melting Pot, Salad Bowl, Chocolate Fondue

Here\’s an opinion piece with a Fourth of July spirit that I wrote for the (Minnesota) Star Tribune newspaper. It was published on Sunday, June 29, 2013.
\”Analogies for America: Beyond the Melting Pot\”
 Timothy Taylor

Melting pot or salad bowl? For decades now, these two contestants have been slugging it out in the contest for most appropriate metaphor for how the cultures and ethnicities of America fit together. But my preference is to think of America as chocolate fondue.
The popularization of “the melting pot” metaphor is usually traced to a soppy, sentimental and very popular play of that name by an immigrant named Israel Zangwill that opened in Washington in 1908. The melting pot metaphor is a way of expressing “E pluribus unum” — “Out of many, one” — the already old saying adopted in 1782 for the Great Seal of the United States (and which you can see on the back of the $1 bill). “E pluribus unum” has also been imprinted on U.S. coins since the 18th century.
The traditional criticism about the melting pot was that what is special about American culture isn’t its homogeneity, but rather its ability to absorb the elements of many cultures, then pass them around to everyone. For example, as John F. Kennedy wrote in his 1958 book, “A Nation of Immigrants”: “One writer has suggested that a ‘typical American menu’ might include some of the following dishes: ‘Irish stew, chop suey, goulash, chile con carne, ravioli, knockwurst mit sauerkraut, Yorkshire pudding, Welsh rarebit, borscht, gefilte fish, Spanish omelette, caviar, mayonnaise, antipasto, baumkuchen, English muffins, gruyère cheese, Danish pastry, Canadian bacon, hot tamales, wienerschnitzel, petit fours, spumoni, bouillabaisse, mate, scones, Turkish coffee, minestrone, filet mignon.’ ”
In our multicultural and individualist age, the common complaint is that the metaphor says that Americans should surrender our cultural and ethnic identities. This critique strikes me as overwrought. Yes, the culture of the country where you live is constraining. But what’s distinctive about modern America is the looseness of these constraints, and the array of available choices.
However, it does bother me that the melting pot metaphor is a relic of a bygone time, when melting different metals together was a common for many industrial workers. It also bothers me that melting different metals together produces a desired outcome only if you adhere to a formula. Bronze is copper and tin. Brass is copper and zinc. If you just dump different metals into a melting pot, what comes out is likely to be flawed and brittle, not strong or useful. When supporters of the melting pot metaphor start talking, it often turns out that they have a clear mental formula for what it means to be American — and it isn’t always my formula.

The notion of America as a salad bowl seems to have been popularized by the eminent historian Carl Degler. His book “Out of Our Past: The Forces that Shaped Modern America” was a commonly used textbook from the 1950s up through the 1980s. In the 1959 edition, he wrote: “[S]ome habits from the old country were not discarded; in those instances the children of immigrants even into the third and fourth generations retained their differences. In view of such failure to melt and fuse, the metaphor of the melting pot is unfortunate and misleading. A more accurate analogy would be a salad bowl, for, although the salad is an entity, the lettuce can still be distinguished from the chicory, the tomatoes from the cabbage.”
While the salad bowl metaphor has a healthy, crunchy “eat your vegetables” ring to it, it seems awkward to me as well. After all, who is the pale and crunchy iceberg lettuce? Who is arugula? Who are the artificial bacon bits? Who are anchovies? Salad ingredients are not all created equal.
Salad is always falling apart, and you can almost never get all of the ingredients, in just the right proportions, into your mouth at the same time. Imagine the oversized modern salad bar, with multiple kinds of lettuces and vegetables, but also seeds and nuts, tuna salad, slices of chicken or ham, bean salad, hard-boiled eggs, crackers and popcorn, along with choice of soup and dessert. It misses what is cohesive and distinctive about America to see the country as a long buffet of ingredients, which we all choose to exclude or include according to our transient appetites of day.
My own suggestion is that America is chocolate fondue. Our different cultural and ethnic backgrounds are the strawberries, pineapple, and cherries, the graham crackers and cookies, the pound cake and brownies, the rice crispy treats and marshmallows, the popcorn and the peppermint sticks. Then we are dipped in America. We swim in America. We are coated in America. Because Americans can and do come from all ethnicities and races, we all look like Americans.
Of course, chocolate doesn’t always deliver on its promise. It can become grainy, rancid, burnt and bitter. Some people have no taste for chocolate, or are even allergic to it. America has often not lived up to its promises and ideals. But when I think consider all the human beings who have ever lived, in all the different places and times around the world, I feel profoundly fortunate to be living in modern America.
There’s an old story about when heavyweight boxing champion Joe Louis decided to enlist in the U.S. Army in 1942. A friend of his objected, and said: “It’s a white man’s Army, Joe, not a black man’s Army.” But Joe Louis had observed the Nazi propaganda machine close up, as the result of his two epic fights against the German Max Schmeling (who was not a Nazi, but whom the Nazis attempted to exploit). So Louis told his friend: “Lots of things wrong with America, but Hitler ain’t going to fix them.”
In that spirit, I’d say lots of things are wrong with America, but often, the best answers for what’s wrong with America are a bigger dose of what’s right with America. On the Fourth of July, I choose to sit with family and friends, and to savor the textures and sweetness of our shared American experience.
————
Timothy Taylor is managing editor of the Journal of Economic Perspectives, based at ­Macalester College in St. Paul. He blogs at http://conversableeconomist.blogspot.com.

Economic Underpinnings of the U.S. Revolutionary War

The U.S. war for independence from Britain is often described in terms a desire for democratic self-government and protection of the rights of citizens. But among historians, there has been a long tradition arguing that economic factors were more important. Perhaps most famously, Charles Beard argued back in 1913 in his book, An Economic Interpretation of the Constitution of the United States that the Founding Fathers were just out to protect their own personal property. But as the decades passed, a consensus developed that Beard\’s arguments was so simplistic and contentious and stark that it was just wrong.

(This post was originally published on January 31, 2012, and is reprinted here for the July 4 holiday).

Staughton Lynd and David Waldstreicher offer a refreshing take on the role of economic forces in the U.S. Revolution in \”Free Trade, Sovereignty, and Slavery: Toward and Economic Interpretation of American Independence.\” It appears in the October 2011 issue of the William and Mary Quarterly, which is not freely available on-line, but will be available to many with academic ties if their institution has a certain kind of JSTOR subscription. Here\’s their opening (footnotes omitted):

\”What kind of revolution was the American Revolution? Four basic answers, all first suggested before 1800, continue to shape the scholarship. They can be denoted Answers A, B, C, and D.

Answer A was advanced by the Revolution\’s leaders and echoed by their friends in Great Britain, such as Edmund Burke: The American Revolution was a struggle for constitutional rights.

Answer B was that of the Revolution\’s opponents, again both in the American colonies and in Great Britain: The American Revolution was a struggle for economic independence from the British Navigation Acts and other economic restrictions. 

Answers C an D were put forward in a second round of controversy during the 1790s, as Americans tried to determine their proper relationship to the French Revolution. Answer C was that of the Jeffersonians: The American Revolution was a democratic movement essentially similar to the French Revolution. Their Federalist opponents responded with Answer D: The American Revolution was a colonialist independence movement essentially different from the French Revolution. 

We offer for further exploration what might be described as a B-D interpretation. That is, the American Revolution was basically a colonial independence movement and the reasons for it were fundamentally economic.\”

I can\’t hope to summarize their argument point-by-point, but in large part, it comes down to pointing out how economic conflicts were often prior in time other events of the Revolution,  and loomed large in importance. Britain often sought to tax or even to embargo various kinds of trade from the American colonies to the West Indies: for example, the import tax with the Molasses Act of 1733, or the way in which the British Navy tried to cut off trade between the colonies and the French West Indies during the Seven Years\’ War. The \”single most contentious issue\” in the First Continental Congress in 1774 was about the extent to which the British Parliament could regulate the U.S. economy, including these and other limits on navigation as well as acts that sought to prohibit manufacturing in the colonies (so that the colonies would need to import from Britain, instead). After reviewing the history in some detail, they write:

\”The commercial dispute preceded the constitutional, not just once but again and again in these years. It is important that colonists melded economic and constitutional arguments under the category of sovereignty–but not so important that we should ignore the originating nature of economic forces.\”

To anyone who has passed through the U.S. public school system, or who has listened to the rhetoric of politicians, thinking of U.S. independence as driven by economic motives has nearly sacrilegious overtones. Lynd and Waldstreicher respond like this:

\”If the American Revolution had fundamentally economic causes, it is not thereby demeaned. Post-World War II colonial independence movements should have taught us something about the many-sided meanings of economic sovereignty for developing nations. If not only merchants but also artisans, tenant farmers, cash-strapped yeoman, fishermen, and debt-ridden slave-owning planters can be shown to have had compelling economic reasons to favor independence, it should not seem too narrow or conspiratorial to suggest that they acted on these reasons and sought to combine them with a language that spoke to principles as well as to the bottom line.\”

To me, it seems quite plausible and believable that the urge of the colonists to move beyond protest and into actual war and rebellion needed the push of economic factors. In addition, if we have learned nothing else from last two centuries, it should be that when anyone starts talking about a revolution is needed for freedom and justice and for people to get their \”rights,\” warning sirens should go off in your brain. Such promises from revolutionaries have certainly been betrayed far more than they have been honored.

But it also seems to me that the cause of an event is often quite different than the lasting legacy of that same event. The causes of the U.S. Revolution probably were largely economic, albeit expressed in a language of constitutionalism. But the lasting legacy of American Independence was the creation of a constitutional structure that is flexible enough to adapt and strong enough to endure.

Adam Smith and the Economics of U.S. Independence

For economists around the world, 1776 means the publication date of Adam Smith\’s classic The Wealth of Nations.  Book IV, Chapter 7, is entitled \”Of Colonies.\” Smith expresses the view that Europe contributed very little to the economic success of its American colonies–except for some talented people. He also believed that the while England benefited from trade with its colonies, England also had to bear the costs of defense and of the monopolies on trade that it created. He painted a picture of how the American colonies might be allowed democratic representation, but viewed it as a politically unlikely outcome. He also predicted that even when a nation didn\’t benefit from having colonies, it was still reluctant to let the colonies go peacefully. The quotations here are from the ever-useful \”Library of Economics and Liberty,\” which has number of classic works  of economics freely available in searchable form on-line. (This post was originally published on July 4, 2013.)

Here\’s Smith on the topic of what Europe contributed to its American colonies (with footnotes  omitted for readability): 
\”The policy of Europe, therefore, has very little to boast of, either in the original establishment or, so far as concerns their internal government, in the subsequent prosperity of the colonies of America. Folly and injustice seem to have been the principles which presided over and directed the first project of establishing those colonies; the folly of hunting after gold and silver mines, and the injustice of coveting the possession of a country whose harmless natives, far from having ever injured the people of Europe, had received the first adventurers with every mark of kindness and hospitality…. 
\”The English Puritans, restrained at home, fled for freedom to America, and established there the four governments of New England. The English Catholics, treated with much greater injustice, established that of Maryland; the Quakers, that of Pennsylvania. The Portugueze Jews, persecuted by the Inquisition, stripped of their fortunes, and banished to Brazil, introduced by their example some sort of order and industry among the transported felons and strumpets by whom that colony was originally peopled, and taught them the culture of the sugar-cane. Upon all these different occasions it was not the wisdom and policy, but the disorder and injustice of the European governments which peopled and cultivated America. …\”
\”When those establishments were effectuated, and had become so considerable as to attract the attention of the mother country, the first regulations which she made with regard to them had always in view to secure to herself the monopoly of their commerce; to confine their market, and to enlarge her own at their expence, and, consequently, rather to damp and discourage than to quicken and forward the course of  their prosperity. In the different ways in which this monopoly has been exercised consists one of the most essential differences in the policy of the different European nations with regard to their colonies. The best of them all, that of England, is only somewhat less illiberal and oppressive than that of any of the rest.\”

\”In what way, therefore, has the policy of Europe contributed either to the first establishment, or to the present grandeur of the colonies of America? In one way, and in one way only, it has contributed a good deal. … It bred and formed the men who were capable of achieving such great actions, and of laying the foundation of so great an empire; and there is no other quarter of the world of which the policy is capable of forming, or has ever actually and in fact formed such men. The colonies owe to the policy of Europe the education and great views of their active and enterprising founders; and some of the greatest and most important of them, so far as concerns their internal government, owe to it scarce anything else.\”

Smith\’s discussion of how Europe has benefited from its American  colonies turns on three main themes. First, he emphasizes (as one might expect) how Europe can benefit both as a consumer of imported goods from the colonies and a producer of exported goods to its colonies. Second, he points out that the colonies do not pay for their own defense, let alone add to the strength of their European colonizers, and so the cost to the European nation of maintaining order in peacetime and then fighting the wars of the colonies must be taken into account. Third, he emphasizes that colonizing countries each sought to monopolize commerce with their colonies. A a result, those who hold the monopoly over transporting such goods profit, but the overall economic gains from trade are reduced, and a number of other dislocations and inefficiencies arise. In effect, the country of England pays the costs of the colonies in order to benefit the merchants who hold the monopoly on trade, even as the flow of resources to that monopoly weakens other aspects of England\’s economy. In Smiths phrase, the purpose of the empire became \”raising up a people of customers\” for  certain favored English \”shopkeepers.\” Smith wrote:

\”To found a great empire for the sole purpose of raising up a people of customers may at first sight appear a project fit only for a nation of shopkeepers. It is, however, a project altogether unfit for a nation of shopkeepers; but extremely fit for a nation whose government is influenced by shopkeepers. Such statesmen, and such statesmen only, are capable of fancying that they will find some advantage in employing the blood and treasure of their fellow-citizens to found and maintain such an empire. Say to a shopkeeper, Buy me a good estate, and I shall always buy my clothes at your shop, even though I should pay somewhat dearer than what I can have them for at other shops; and you will not find him very forward to embrace your proposal. But should any other person buy you such an estate, the shopkeeper would be much obliged to your benefactor if he would enjoin you to buy all your clothes at his shop. England purchased for some of her subjects, who found themselves uneasy at home, a great estate in a distant country. The price, indeed, was very small, and instead of thirty years purchase, the ordinary price of land in the present times, it amounted to little more than the expence of the different equipments which made the first discovery, reconnoitred the coast, and took a fictitious possession of the country. The land was good and of great extent, and the cultivators having plenty of good ground to work upon, and being for some time at liberty to sell their produce where they pleased, became in the course of little more than thirty or forty years (between 1620 and 1660) so numerous and thriving a people that the shopkeepers and other traders of England wished to secure to themselves the monopoly of their custom. Without pretending, therefore, that they had paid any part, either of the original purchase-money, or of the subsequent expence of improvement, they petitioned the parliament that the cultivators of America might for the future be confined to their shop; first, for buying all the goods  which they wanted from Europe; and, secondly, for selling all such parts of their own produce as those traders might find it convenient to buy. … A clause in the famous act of navigation established this truly shopkeeper proposal into a law.\”

\”In order, however, to obtain this relative advantage in the colony trade, in order to execute the invidious and malignant project of excluding as much as possible other nations from any share in it, England, there are very probable reasons for believing, has not only sacrificed a part of the absolute advantage which she, as well as every other nation, might have derived from that trade, but has subjected herself both to an absolute and to a relative disadvantage in almost every other branch of trade. … \”

Smith discussed various possibilities for how Great Britain might deal with its colonies. One proposal was that Great Britain should just \”voluntarily give up all authority over her colonies,\” which would then allow Britain and America, in friendship to benefit from free trade between them. But he despaired of this possibility.

\”To propose that Great Britain should voluntarily give up all authority over her colonies, and leave them to elect their own magistrates, to enact their own laws, and to make peace and war as they might think proper, would be to propose such a measure as never was, and never will be adopted, by any nation in the world. No nation ever voluntarily gave up the dominion of any province, how troublesome soever it might be to govern it, and how small soever the revenue which it afforded might be in proportion to the expence which it occasioned. Such sacrifices, though they might frequently be agreeable to the interest, are always mortifying to the pride of every nation, and what is perhaps of still greater consequence, they are always contrary to the private interest of the governing part of it, who would thereby be deprived of the disposal of many places of trust and profit, of many opportunities of acquiring wealth and distinction, which the possession of the most turbulent, and, to the great body of the people, the most unprofitable province seldom fails to afford. The most visionary enthusiast would scarce be capable of proposing such a measure with any serious hopes at least of its ever being adopted. If it was adopted, however, Great Britain would not only be immediately freed from the whole annual expence of the peace establishment of the colonies, but might settle with them such a treaty of commerce as would effectually secure to her a free trade, more advantageous to the great body of the people, though less so to the merchants, than the monopoly which she at present enjoys. By thus parting good friends, the natural affection of the colonies to the mother country which, perhaps, our late dissensions have well nigh extinguished, would quickly revive. It might dispose them not only to respect, for whole centuries together, that treaty of commerce which they had concluded with us at parting, but to favour us in war as well  as in trade, and, instead of turbulent and factious subjects, to become our most faithful, affectionate, and generous allies …\”

As an alternative, Smith suggested that there could be taxation with representation: that is, Americans could be given representation in the British parliament. He argues that if Americans were offered such a possibility, many of their leaders would be delighted with the chance to rise in British politics. But denied such a possibility, the American leaders feel a

\”The parliament of Great Britain insists upon taxing the colonies; and they refuse to be taxed by a Parliament in which they are not represented. If to each colony, which should detach itself from the general confederacy, Great Britain should allow such a number of representatives as suited the proportion of what is contributed to the public revenue of the empire, in consequence of its being subjected to the same taxes, and in compensation admitted to the same freedom of trade with its fellow-subjects at home; the number of its representatives to be augmented as the proportion of its contribution might afterwards augment; a new method of acquiring importance, a new and more dazzling object of ambition would be presented to the leading men of each colony. Instead of piddling for the little prizes which are to be found in what may be called the paltry raffle of colony faction; they might then hope, from the presumption which men naturally have in their own ability and good fortune, to draw some of the great prizes which sometimes come from the wheel of the great state lottery of British polities.

\”Unless this or some other method is fallen upon, and there seems to be none more obvious than this, of preserving the importance and of gratifying the ambition of the leading men of America, it is not very probable that they will ever voluntarily submit to us; and we ought to consider that the blood which must be shed in forcing them to do so is, every drop of it, blood either of those who are, or of those whom we wish to have for our fellow-citizens. They are very weak who flatter themselves that, in the state to which things have come, our colonies will be easily conquered by force alone. The persons who now govern the resolutions of what they call their continental congress, feel in themselves at this moment a degree of importance which, perhaps, the greatest subjects in Europe scarce feel. From shopkeepers, tradesmen, and attornies, they are become statesmen and legislators, and are employed in contriving a new form of government for an extensive empire, which, they flatter themselves, will become, and which, indeed, seems very likely to become, one of the greatest and most formidable that ever was in the world. … Almost every individual of the governing party in America fills, at present in his own fancy, a station superior, not only to what he had ever filled before, but to what he had ever expected to fill; and unless some new object of ambition is presented either to him or to his leaders, if he has the ordinary spirit of a man, he will die in defence of that station.\” 

And of course, Smith\’s prediction, published in 1776 but largely written several years earlier, came true. To repeat, on this Fourth of July: \”From shopkeepers, tradesmen, and attornies, they are become statesmen and legislators, and are employed in contriving a new form of government for an extensive empire, which, they flatter themselves, will become, and which, indeed, seems very likely to become, one of the greatest and most formidable that ever was in the world.\”

Janet Yellen Takes Macroprudential Policy Mainstream

Macroprudential policy is going mainstream. At least, Janet Yellen says so in her lecture on \”Monetary Policy and Financial Stability,\” given on July 2 as the 2014 Michel Camdessus Central Banking Lecture at the International Monetary Fund. For example, Yellen says at the start of the lecture:

\”I will argue that monetary policy faces significant limitations as a tool to promote financial stability: Its effects on financial vulnerabilities, such as excessive leverage and maturity transformation, are not well understood and are less direct than a regulatory or supervisory approach; in addition, efforts to promote financial stability through adjustments in interest rates would increase the volatility of inflation and employment. As a result, I believe a macroprudential approach to supervision and regulation needs to play the primary role.\”

So what is this macroprudential policy that the Chair of the Federal Reserve says needs to play \”the primary role\” in addressing financial stability, because conventional monetary policy \”faces significant limitations\” in the task? Academics have been talking about it for a few years: for examples, see my post on \”Macroprudential Monetary Policy: What It is, How it Works\” (June 20, 2013), or for a sense of the deeper economic analysis behind macroprudential policy, a useful starting point is \”A Macroprudential Approach to Financial Regulation,\” by Samuel G. Hansen, Anil K. Kashyap, and Jeremy C. Stein, which appeared in the Winter 2011 issue of the Journal of Economic Perspectives. (Full disclosure: My job as Managing Editor of JEP has been paying the household bills since 1986.)

Yellen looks back at the controversy over the housing price bubble that emerged in the U.S. economy in the middle 2000s. For a sense of the dispute, here\’s a graph showing the federal funds interest rate, the key policy tool that the Fed focused on at the the time. Notice that with the recession of 2001, the Fed cut this rate to stimulate the economy. Reducing the interest rate in a recession is standard practice, but the rate was also cut quite far (as you can see, more than after the 1990-91 recession) and the low rate was then maintained for several years after the 2001 recession had ended. Both at the time, and since then, there has been a controversy that if the Fed had not cut interest rates quite as far, or held interest rates so low for quite as long, then the borrowing that fed the housing price bubble would have been more muted.

Yellen argues in response that higher interest rates would not have addressed many of the other issues feeding the housing price bubble: like \”gaps in the regulatory structure that allowed some SIFIs [systemically important financial institutions] and markets to escape comprehensive supervision, or the lack of \”transparency of exotic financial instruments,\” or \”deficiencies in risk measurement and risk management within the private sector.\” She argues that using higher interest rates to address financial vulnerability is \”a very blunt tool.\” The unemployment rate remained elevated for a time after the 2001 recession in what has now become the U.S. pattern of \”jobless recoveries.\” Yellen argues that higher interest rates back in the early 2000s would have had at best a modest effect in keeping housing prices lower, but it unemployment would have stayed higher for longer. She also point out that \”vulnerabilities from excessive leverage and reliance on short-term funding in the financial sector grew rapidly through the middle of 2007, well after monetary policy had already tightened significantly relative to the accommodative policy stance of 2003 and early 2004.\”

What is macroprudential policy? In the past, financial regulation typically focused on whether individual financial institutions were fundamentally healthy. It considered at one financial institution at a time. The \”macro\” in macroprudential policy is meant to suggest that regulatory policies and standards should be adjusted with macroeconomic concerns in  mind. Thus, if there is a concern over housing prices rising in a way that leads to a risk of a bubble, government can raise the standards that affect conditions under which banks make loans–leading to smaller loan sizes relative to income or higher down payments. If there is a concern that many financial and nonfinancial institutions are taking on too much debt, in a way that raises the risk of a financial crisis, regulatory standards can be used to require that the institutions hold higher reserves. If there is concern that certain financial instruments are not transparent, or that the risks of such instruments are not being taken into account, regulatory policy can require additional disclosure and require that financial institutions find ways to ameliorate the additional risks.

Yellen is in effect suggesting a division of labor. Conventional monetary policy, like raising and lowering interest rates, would continue to be the main method for addressing recession and inflation. But macroprudential policies would be the way of reducing the chance that a financial crisis would happen. As she says: \”In my assessment, macroprudential policies, such as regulatory limits on leverage and short-term funding, as well as stronger underwriting standards, represent far more direct and likely more effective methods to address these [financial stability] vulnerabilities.\”

Actually, this change is already happening. Yellen says: \”We have made considerable progress in implementing a macroprudential approach in the United States …\”

As a current example in the U.S economy, she offers the following more detailed discussion:

\”I do see pockets of increased risk-taking across the financial system, and an acceleration or broadening of these concerns could necessitate a more robust macroprudential approach. For example, corporate bond spreads, as well as indicators of expected volatility in some asset markets, have fallen to low levels, suggesting that some investors may underappreciate the potential for losses and volatility going forward. In addition, terms and conditions in the leveraged-loan market, which provides credit to lower-rated companies, have eased significantly, reportedly as a result of a \”reach for yield\” in the face of persistently low interest rates. The Federal Reserve, the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, and the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation issued guidance regarding leveraged lending practices in early 2013 and followed up on this guidance late last year. To date, we do not see a systemic threat from leveraged lending, since broad measures of credit outstanding do not suggest that nonfinancial borrowers, in the aggregate, are taking on excessive debt and the improved capital and liquidity positions at lending institutions should ensure resilience against potential losses due to their exposures. But we are mindful of the possibility that credit provision could accelerate, borrower losses could rise unexpectedly sharply, and that leverage and liquidity in the financial system could deteriorate.\”

Macroprudential policy is no magic bullet. It requires figuring out where risk-taking has become excessive, where bubbles may be forming in financial markets, and deciding how to react. There is a danger that central banks–which after all, do come under political pressure–will feel some need to prop up asset market values, not just to pop price bubbles as they threaten to inflate. But the Federal Reserve, and a number of other central banks around the world, are now embracing the challenge of macroprudential policy as part of their core mission.

Glenn Loury on Discrimination

Douglas Clement has yet another in his fine series of interviews with economists, this one with Glenn Loury, published in the June 2014 issue of The Region, a publication of the Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis. Here are a few insights from Loury\’s work on discrimination, but the interview also touches on crime and incarceration, inequality, and the evolution of economic theory. 

A standard approach to studying discrimination in labor markets is to collect data on what people earn and their race/ethnicity or gender, along with a number of other variables like years of education, family structure, region where they live, occupation, years of job experience, and so on. This data lets you answer the question: can we account for differences in income across groups by looking at these kinds of observable traits other than race/ethnicity and gender? If so, a common implication is that the problem in our society may be that certain groups aren\’t getting enough education, or that children from single-parent families  need more support–but that a pay gap which can be explained by observable factors other than race/ethnicity and gender isn\’t properly described as \”discrimination.\” Loury challenges this approach, arguing that many of the observable factors are themselves the outcome of a history of discriminatory practices. He says:

\”By that I mean, suppose I have a regression equation with wages on the left-hand side and a number of explanatory variables—like schooling, work experience, mental ability, family structure, region, occupation and so forth—on the right-hand side. These variables might account for variation among individuals in wages, and thus one should control for them if the earnings of different racial or ethnic groups are to be compared. One could put many different variables on the right-hand side of such a wage regression.

Well, many of those right-hand-side variables are determined within the very system of social interactions that one wants to understand if one is to effectively explain large and persistent earnings differences between groups. That is, on the average, schooling, work experience, family structure or ability (as measured by paper and pencil tests) may differ between racial groups, and those differences may help to explain a group disparity in earnings. But those differences may to some extent be a consequence of the same structure of social relations that led to employers having the discriminatory attitudes they may have in the work place toward the members of different groups.

So, the question arises: Should an analyst who is trying to measure the extent of “economic discrimination” hold the group accountable for the fact that they have bad family structure? Is a failure to complete high school, or a history of involvement in a drug-selling gang that led to a criminal record, part of what the analyst should control for when explaining the racial wage gap—so that the uncontrolled gap is no longer taken as an indication of the extent of unfair treatment of the group?

Well, one answer for this question is, “Yes, that was their decision.” They could have invested in human capital and they didn’t. Employer tastes don’t explain that individual decision. So as far as that analyst is concerned, the observed racial disparity would not be a reflection of social exclusion and mistreatment based on race. …  But another way to look at it is that the racially segregated social networks in which they were located reflected a history of deprivation of opportunity and access for people belonging to their racial group. And that history fostered a pattern of behavior, attitudes, values and practices, extending across generations, which are now being reflected in what we see on the supply side of the present day labor market, but which should still be thought of as a legacy of historical racial discrimination, if properly understood.

Or at least in terms of policy, it should be a part of what society understands to be the consequences of unfair treatment, not what society understands to be the result of the fact that these people don’t know how to get themselves ready for the labor market.

When I\’m giving a talk on these issues, I point out that there are a variety of kinds of discrimination. One kind of discrimination is when an employer treats two people with the same qualifications differently because of race or gender. Another kind of discrimination can cause social conditions that lead to people being more likely to have different qualifications in the first place. I have argued that this pattern means that suing employers for discrimination should thus have a smaller place, and trying to equalize qualifications should have a bigger place. But Loury has a thought-provoking response to this approach.

In one of his papers, Loury considers various kinds of interventions that have a goal of reducing the effects of discriminatory behavior. He draws two distinctions. You can intervene early–say, trying to assure better grade-school performance, a better high school graduation rate, and a higher level of college attendance. Or you can intervene later, when people are actually applying for jobs. You can also intervene in a :\”blind\” way, which favors a broad group that will be disproportionately of a certain race, or in a \”sighted\” way that favors the group specifically. Thus, expanding government funding for preschool programs for low-income families is in these terms an early \”blind\” intervention. A quota for hiring a certain percentage of African Americans or other ethnic groups to certain jobs is a late \”sighted\” intervention.

I tend to favor the first kind of intervention, to which Loury offers a couple of counterarguments. One is that a later \”sighted\” policy is also an incentive for skills acquisition at an earlier age. As Loury puts it:

One of our key insights is that under sightedness (again, overt discrimination in favor of a particular group), the very act of boosting people’s access to slots—that is, putting a thumb on the scale in their favor at the point where they compete for positions—implies a subsidy to their acquisition of skills. … [I]f a later intervention is properly anticipated, then an earlier intervention may not be necessary; it may be redundant. … Now, this result—that we find quite interesting—requires the assumption I just referred to: that when making their decisions about how to invest in the development of their skills, people be farsighted enough to anticipate the consequences of their being favored at the point of slots allocation. That assumption will not be plausible in every case (youngsters can be unnervingly short-sighted…).\”

However, if one is willing to grant the possibility that knowing certain jobs are likely to be available will tend to encourage skills acquisition earlier, Loury then offers another point. There is a classic question in the economics of taxation that considers whether a country should impose taxes on a variety of inputs to the production process, or instead a tax on outputs. The general finding is that the negative effects of the tax are smaller if you impose them at the end of the production process, because then the taxes don\’t also have a distortionary effect on the process of production itself. There\’s a related classic question in the economics of monopolies, which asks whether it\’s worse for an economy to have a monopolist that raises the price on an input used by many producers, or for a monopolist to raise the prices to consumers. Again, the negative effects of monopoly are smaller if they result in higher prices at the end of the production process.

Loury and a co-author create a model that applies similar reasoning to the question of when to intervene to stop discrimination, with the implication being that intervention at the later stage of being hired may be less burdensome to an economy than intervention at the earlier stage. Loury says:

\”The distortion (in our case, preferences for a disadvantaged group) should take place “downstream,” at the point of competition for final positions, rather than “upstream,” at the point where people are investing in their own productivity. … Now, you’d think that for affirmative action it might be different, that, well, it’s always better to go early. … Pre-K is something people are advocating these days. And, indeed, there may be other reasons, not in our model, having to do with cycles of development and so forth, which would explain why early intervention of a different kind is warranted. But if it’s purely in the framework of our model, I think our finding is explicable in terms of intuitions that you find in other areas of economics.\”

I\’m not sure I\’m persuaded! But Loury\’s tight analysis and probing insights are always worth reading. If you would like to read more of Loury laying out these ideas, a possible starting point is an article he wrote for the Spring 1998 of the Journal of Economic Perspectives, called \”Discrimination in the Post-Civil Rights Era: Beyond Market Interactions.\” Like all JEP articles, it is freely available on-line courtesy of the American Economic Association. (Full disclosure: I\’ve been Managing Editor of the JEP since the inception of the journal in 1987.)

U.S. Government Spending on Families: International Perspective

Every American politician favors families. But compared with other countries, the spending doesn\’t back up the rhetoric. The OECD has published its 2014 Economic Survey of the United States, and which includes a \”Thematic Chapter\” on \”Improving Well-Being.\” The chapter offers this figure on what share of GDP is spent on programs supporting families. The average OECD country spends 2.6% of GDP on programs focused on supporting families. The U.S. ranks third from the bottom on this list exceeding only Mexico and Korea.

To be clear, this figure is really focused on programs specifically aimed at families with children. It doesn\’t look at programs like health care or housing that can also help those with low incomes, but is not exclusively aimed at families with children. In the U.S. context, Medicaid isn\’t included here.

As the figure shows, many countries make substantial cash payments specifically to families with children. the U.S. has largely shifted to supporting families with children through the tax code–like the child tax credit and the earned income tax credit. Public support in the U.S. for child care and parental leave are also relatively low. For example, here is how the U.S. compares with other OECD countries in education spending. The U.S. stacks up pretty well in spending on K-12 education, but lags well behind in spending in early childhood.

Perhaps not surprisingly, a relatively smaller proportion of U.S. four-year olds are enrolled in a some kind of school or preschool program.

From time to time on this blog–for example, here, here, and here–I\’ve aired concerns that the U.S. research on benefits of early childhood education is a good deal less convincing than I would like. But the young children of today will be America\’s adults of tomorrow. For my comfort level, too high a proportion of those American children are struggling academically and socially. At the youngest ages in particular, the U.S. government just isn\’t making that much of an effort.

Sick Shrimp Supply Shock

Perhaps economists are the only ones who feel their pulses accelerate at a title like \”Shrimp disease in Asia resulting in high U.S. import prices.\” But when explaining intro economics, there\’s always room for one more supply and demand example.  Kristen Reed and Sharon Royales from the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics lay out some facts about supply shocks in the shrimp market in a short \”Beyond the Numbers\” (June 2014, vol. 3, no. 14). They write (footnotes omitted):

Shrimp has become a popular purchase for American consumers, with U.S. consumption of shrimp reaching 3.8 pounds per person in 2012. Demand for shrimp has increased over the years, and shrimp is currently the largest imported seafood species, accounting for 29 percent of seafood imports by dollar value. In 2013, consumers and businesses found themselves paying higher prices with less product available in supermarkets and restaurants. For example, the popular restaurant chain Red Lobster recently saw a 35-percent increase in the price the company paid for shrimp. The price hike contributed to a 3.1-percent increase in the company’s overall food costs and, more recently, an 18-percent decrease in earnings during the quarter that ended in February 2014. Similarly, Noodles & Company noted that the cost of shrimp in its pasta dishes would rise 29 percent this year.

The reason for the higher shrimp prices is a shortage of imports from the top shrimp producers in Southeast Asia. With about 90 percent of shrimp consumed in the United States coming from imports, any change in foreign supply affects both U.S. import prices and overall consumer prices. … A large contributor to the seafood price increases was a disease-related decline in supplies from the top three shrimp-producing countries: Thailand, Vietnam, and China.

Here\’s the pattern of U.S. shrimp prices over the last 10 years from the Index Mundi website, based on price data collected by the International Monetary Fund (as part of its data on \”primary commodities\”).

The more modest price rise for shrimp back in 2010 apparently reflects, according to Reed and Royales a previous outbreak of shrimp diseases in other countries, together with the effect of the Deepwater Horizon oil spill on shrimpers in the Gulf of Mexico. Here\’s a figure from the Reed and Royales showing quantities of U.S. shrimp imports from China, Vietnam, and Thailand.

For context, here\’s some data on overall US shrimp supply from the National Marine Fisheries Service at NOAA. The most recent data available here only go through 2012, and so only show the start of the supply drop-off.

There\’s an old rule for holding a successful friendly dinner party: never seat two economists beside each other. But if you draw the short straw and end up sitting next to an economist when you\’re out for a nice seafood dinner, feel free to discuss diseased Asian shrimp, oil spills, and the resulting price fluctuations. The economist will regard it as normal meal-time conversation.

Sluggish US Investment

There has been enormous attention paid, and rightly so, to how slowly U.S. labor markets have rebounded since the Great Recession. But the sluggish rebound of U.S. business investment deserves attention, too. Here is the pattern of private nonresidential fixed investment in the U.S. divided by GDP, created with the help of the ever-useful FRED website. During the worst of the Great Recession, investment fell to levels comparable to troughs of recessions in the 1970s and the early 1990s. But even with some bounce-back since 2009, the level of U.S. investment remains low by historical levels.

This low level of investment is showing up in a number of recent discussions. For example, Robert Hall recently calculated that the U.S. GDP is now 13% below where it would be if it had remained on the average trend path fro 1990-2007. He attributes 3.9 percentage points of that gap to a shortfall in business capital. Lawrence Summers gave a recent speech about \”U.S. Economic Prospects: Secular Stagnation, Hysteresis, and the Zero Lower Bound.\” The secular stagnation argument, dating back to a 1938 paper by Alvin Hansen, makes the claim that a strong level of investment is needed for a full-employment economy. Hansen argues that historically, high levels of investment have been driven by three factors: 1) innovation and new technology; 2) a rising  population; and 3) the discovery of new territory and resources.  He argued in 1938 that the last two causes were looking unlikely, and so the U.S. economy needed to focus on innovation and new technology.

As Summers points out, the last two U.S. economic upswings–the dot-com boom of the 1990s and the housing boom of the mid-2000s–were driven by rising investment levels. Of course, the busts that followed these booms were not created equal. The dot-com boom led to high levels of investment in information and communications technology that has paid off in productivity gains, and was followed by a drop in stock prices and the relatively brief and shallow recession in 2001. The financial losses around 2001 were concentrated in stock prices. The housing boom led to more houses, which will not have an effect of boosting future productivity, and was followed by a financial crises and Great Recession that shook the U.S. economy to its roots. Thus, the challenge is not just to have more investment, but to have it in a way that improves productivity and doesn\’t set the stage for a financial earthquake.

The very slow rebound in investment isn\’t obvious to explain.

One possible explanation is a rise in economic uncertainty, as U.S. firms and consumers try to process what hit them during the Great Recession and how to deal with the various major pieces of legislation Congress has passed since then. At some basic level, the very slow rebound in investment is troubling because it suggests that business doesn\’t perceive the U.S. economy as having opportunities for future growth.

A second possibility is that some small and medium-size firms may be having trouble finding sources of financing for investment. However,  many larger firms have sizable profits and are sitting on cash, with what appears to be the ability to borrow if they wish to do so, but they are not choosing to invest. Here\’s a figure from Summers\’s lecture showing corporate profits in recent years.

A third possibility is that despite running budget deficits and low interest rates at levels that would have astonished almost anyone back in 2007, there is still insufficient demand in the economy to encourage sufficient business investment.

A fourth possibility is that businesses are doing a lot of investment, but it\’s often a form of investment that involves reorganizing their firm around new information and communications technology–whether in terms of design, business operation, or far-flung global production networks. As a result, this form of investment doesn\’t involve enough demand to push the economy to full employment. Summers suggests this argument as a possibility in his talk as well.

Ponder that the leading technological companies of this age—I think, for example, of Apple and Google—find themselves swimming in cash and facing the challenge of what to do with a very large cash hoard. Ponder the fact that WhatsApp has a greater market value than Sony, with next to no capital investment required to achieve it. Ponder the fact that it used to require tens of millions of dollars to start a significant new venture, and significant new ventures today are seeded with hundreds of thousands of dollars. All of
this means reduced demand for investment … 

As another way to see this point, here\’s a price index for capital equipment. As Summers says: \”Cheaper capital goods mean that investment goods can be achieved with less borrowing and spending,
reducing the propensity for investment.\”

What might be done to encourage a resurgence in business investment? Low interest rates and large government budget deficits haven\’t been a sufficient answer so far.

One suggestion from Summers is large boost in government spending on infrastructure. I confess that this idea leaves me a little cold. Sure, we can all think of examples where infrastructure spending would be useful. Summers likes to kvetch about the griminess of Kennedy Airport. Here in Minnesota, a major bridge in Minneapolis suddenly collapsed in August 2007, killing 13 people and injuring more than 100. For economists, the trick with infrastructure spending is always to think about the right mixture of price incentives to manage congestion and damage along with pouring concrete–and to try to focus on projects with a large payoff, not just pork barrel spending. While I can easily support appropriately targeted and priced infrastructure spending, I don\’t think that growth in the 21st century economy is going to be built on wider highways.

Summers also suggests actively promoting and encouraging exports, and I\’ve argued on this blog a number of times that the U.S. should be trying to build ties with the faster-growing portions of the world economy. Of course, this is a somewhat indirect way to encourage investment.

Back in the 1960s and 1970s, the government used to enact an \”investment tax credit\” when the economy was slow. The notion was that firms often have some investment plans up their sleeves, for when times get better. By offering a tax credit that expires in a year or two, you encourage firms to get off their duffs and move those future plans up to the present. The broad-based investment tax credit was always controversial, and it died off with the Tax Reform Act of 1986. Instead, there are now little mini-credits for specific investments like those in cleaner  energy. But given the current investment slump, perhaps a broader investment tax credit should be considered.

Summers also writes in general terms of \”regulatory and tax reforms that would promote private
investment,\” and that agenda seems worth pursuing, too. The U.S. corporate tax code seems clearly out-of-whack with the rest of the world. Back in 1938, Alvin Hanson wrote that one traditional stimulation to investment is the discovery of new resources, and the breakthroughs in unconventional natural gas drilling seem to offer a classic opportunity both to provide cheaper energy to the US economy in a way that respects and addresses the environmental issues. And for fans of infrastructure spending, the energy boom offers a number of opportunities for rail and pipelines.

Finally, I believe that in the 21st century, the U.S. is more dependent on an ability to translate research and development into new products and industries than ever before. R&D spending has been stagnant as a share of GDP for decades. Setting a goal of doubling R&D spending might also be a way to give U.S. business investment a big push.  But one way or another, the U.S. economy isn\’t going to be roaring again–and the U.S. labor market isn\’t likely to recover fully–until U.S. firms start making major new investments in new plant and equipment.