- Steven N. Kaplan and Joshua Rauh. 2013. \”It\’s the Market: The Broad-Based Rise in the Return to Top Talent.\” Journal of Economic Perspectives, 27 (3): 35-56.
- Josh Bivens and Lawrence Mishel. 2013. \”The Pay of Corporate Executives and Financial Professionals as Evidence of Rents in Top 1 Percent Incomes.\” Journal of Economic Perspectives, 27 (3): 57-78.
100 Million Traffic Stops: Evidence on Racial Discrimination
A primary challenge in doing research on racial discrimination is that you need to answer the \”what if\” questions. For example, it\’s not enough for research to show that blacks are pulled over by police for traffic stops more often than whites. What if more blacks were driving in a way that caused them to be pulled over more often? A researcher can\’t just dismiss that possibility. Instead, you need to find a way to think about the available data in a way that addresses these kinds of \”what if\” questions.
When it comes to traffic stops, for example, one approach is to look at such stops in the shifting time window between daytime and darkness. For example, compare the rate at which blacks and whites are pulled over for traffic stops in a certain city during a time of year when it\’s light outside at 7 pm and at a time of year when it\’s dark outside at 7 pm. One key difference here is that when it\’s light outside, it\’s a lot easier for the police to see the race of the driver. If the black-white difference in traffic stops around 7 in the evening is a lot larger when it\’s light at that hour than when it\’s dark at that hour, then racial discrimination is a plausible answer. Taking this idea a step further, a researcher can look at the time period just before and after the Daylight Savings Time time shifts.
A team of authors use this approach and others in \”A large-scale analysis of racial disparities in police stops across the United States,\” published in Nature Human Behavior (July 2020, pp. 736-745, authors are Emma Pierson, Camelia Simoiu, Jan Overgoor , Sam Corbett-Davies, Daniel Jenson, Amy Shoemaker , Vignesh Ramachandran, Phoebe Barghouty, Cheryl Phillips, Ravi Shroff and Sharad Goel ). The authors make public records request in all 50 states, but (so far) have ended up with \”a dataset detailing nearly 100 million traffic stops carried out by 21 state patrol agencies and 35 municipal police departments over almost a decade.\” Their analysis sounds like this:
In particular, among state patrol stops, the annual per-capita stop rate for black drivers was 0.10 compared to 0.07 for white drivers; and among municipal police stops, the annual per-capita stop rate for black drivers was 0.20 compared to 0.14 for white drivers. For Hispanic drivers, however, we found that stop rates were lower than for white drivers: 0.05 for stops conducted by state patrol (compared to 0.07 for white drivers) and 0.09 for those conducted by municipal police departments (compared to 0.14 for white drivers). …
These numbers are a starting point for understanding racial disparities in traffic stops, but they do not, per se, provide strong evidence of racially disparate treatment. In particular, per-capita stop rates do not account for possible race-specific differences in driving behaviour, including amount of time spent on the road and adherence to traffic laws. For example, if black drivers, hypothetically, spend more time on the road than white drivers, that could explain the higher stop rates we see for the former, even in the absence of discrimination. Moreover, drivers may not live in the jurisdictions where they were stopped, further complicating the interpretation of population benchmarks.
But here\’s some data from the Texas State Patrol on the share of blacks stopped in different evening time windows: 7:00-7:15, 7:15-7:30, and 7:30-7:45. A vertical line shows \”dusk,\” considered the time when it is dark. The researchers ignore the 30 minutes before dusk, when the light is fading, and focus on when the period before and after that window. You can see that the share of black drivers stopped is higher in the daylight, and then lower after dark.
Another test for racial discrimination looks at the rate in which cars are searched, and then looks at the success rate of those searches. Interpreting the result of this kind of test can be mildly complex, and it\’s useful to go through two steps to understand the analysis. The the authors explain the first step in this way:
In these jurisdictions, stopped black and Hispanic drivers were searched about twice as often as stopped white drivers. To assess whether this gap resulted from biased decision-making, we apply the outcome test, originally proposed by Becker, to circumvent omitted variable bias in traditional tests of discrimination. The outcome test is based not on the search rate but on the ‘hit rate’: the proportion of searches that successfully turn up contraband. Becker argued that even if minority drivers are more likely to carry contraband, in the absence of discrimination, searched minorities should still be found to have contraband at the same rate as searched whites. If searches of minorities are successful less often than searches of whites, it suggests that officers are applying a double standard, searching minorities on the basis of less evidence. …
Across jurisdictions, we consistently found that searches of Hispanic drivers were less successful than those of white drivers. However, searches of white and black drivers had more comparable hit rates. The outcome test thus indicates that search decisions may be biased against Hispanic drivers, but the evidence is more ambiguous for black drivers.
This approach sounds plausible, but if you think about it a little more deeply, it\’s straightforward to come up with examples where might not work so well. Here\’s an example:
[S]uppose that there are two, easily distinguishable, types of white driver: those who have a 5% chance of carrying contraband and those who have a 75% chance of carrying contraband. Likewise assume that black drivers have either a 5 or 50% chance of carrying contraband. If officers search drivers who are at least 10% likely to be carrying contraband, then searches of white drivers will be successful 75% of the time whereas searches of black drivers will be successful only 50% of the time. Thus, although the search criterion is applied in a race-neutral manner, the hit rate for black drivers is lower than that for white drivers and the outcome test would (incorrectly) conclude that searches are biased against black drivers. The outcome test can similarly fail to detect discrimination when it is present.
To put it another way, the decision to search a vehicle is binary: you do it or you don\’t do it. Thus, the key issue is the threshold that a police officer applies in deciding to search. As in this example, you can think of the threshold in this way: if the percentage chance of finding something is above the threshold level, a search happens; if it\’s below that level, a search doesn\’t happen. The next step is to estimate these threshold probabilities:
In aggregate across cities, the inferred threshold for white drivers is 10.0% compared to 5.0 and 4.6% for black and Hispanic drivers, respectively. … Compared to by-location hit rates, the threshold test more strongly suggests discrimination against black drivers, particularly for municipal stops. Consistent with past work, this difference appears to be driven by a small but disproportionate number of black drivers who have a high inferred likelihood of carrying contraband. Thus, even though the threshold test finds that the bar for searching black drivers is lower than that for white drivers, these groups have more similar hit rates.
A short takeaway from this research is that when blacks complain about being stopped more often by police, there is solid research evidence backing up this claim. The evidence on blacks being searched more often in a traffic stop is real, but probably best-viewed as a little weaker, because it doesn\’t show up in the basic \”success rate of searches\” data and instead requires the more complex threshold analysis.
For other discussions of how social scientists try to pin down evidence the extent to which racial discrimination underlies racial disparities, see:
- \”How Economists and Sociologists See Racial Discrimination Differently\” (May 28, 2020)
- \”An Audit Study of Discrimination in the Boston Rental Market\” (July 6, 2020)
- \”The Random Presence of Females for Discovering Discrimination\” (June 12, 2020)
Misperceptions and Misinformation in Elections Campaigns
It\’s an election season, so many people are widely concerned about how all those other voters are going to be misinformed into voting for the wrong candidate. Brendan Nyhan provides an overview of some research in this area in \”Facts and Myths about Misperceptions\” (Journal of Economic Perspectives, Summer 2020, 34:3, pp. 220-36).
Public beliefs in such claims are frequently associated with people’s candidate preferences and partisanship. One December 2016 poll found that 62 percent of Trump supporters endorsed the baseless claim that millions of illegal votes were cast in the 2016 election, compared to 25 percent of supporters of Hillary Clinton (Frankovic 2016). Conversely, 50 percent of Clinton voters endorsed the false claim that Russia tampered with vote tallies to help Trump, compared to only 9 percent of Trump voters. But not all political misperceptions have a clear partisan valence: for example, 17 percent of Clinton supporters and 15 percent of Trump supporters in the same poll said the US government helped plan the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001.
One of my favorite examples is a study which showed respondents pictures of the Inauguration Day crowds for President Obama in 2009 and President Trump in 2017.: \”When the pictures were unlabeled, there was broad agreement that the Obama crowd was larger, but when the pictures were labelled, many Trump supporters looked at the pictures and indicated that Trump’ crowd was larger, an obviously false claim that the authors refer to as `expressive responding.\’” (I love the term \”expressive responding.\”)
Sometimes that people are aware of slanting their answers in this way. When people give these kinds of answers to poll questions, they often know (and will say when asked) that some of their answers are based on less evidence than others. One study offered small financial incentives (like $1) for accurate answers, and found that the partisan divide was reduce by more than 50%.
But other times, people make meaningful real-world decisions based on these kinds of partisan feelings. as one example with particular relevance just now, evidence from the George W. Bush and Barack Obama administrations suggests that when the president you supported is in office, people \”express more trust in vaccine safety and greater intention to vaccinate themselves and their children than opposition partisans,\” which shows up in actual patterns of school vaccinations.
An underlying pattern that comes up in this research is that if people are exposed to an concept many times (an example is the false statement “The Atlantic Ocean is the largest ocean on Earth”), they become more likely to rate it as true. The underlying psychology here seems to be that when a claim seems familiar to people, because of repeated prior exposure, they become more likely to view it as true. An implication here is that while those who marinate themselves in social media discussions of news may be more likely to think of themselves as well-informed, they are also probably more likely to have severe misperceptions. Indeed, people who are more knowledgeable are also the same people who have become aware of how to deploy counterarguments so that they believe their misperceptions even more strongly.
Nyhan\’s paper mentions many intriguing studies along these lines. But do we need public action to fight misperceptions? It\’s not clear that we do. A common finding in these studies is that if someone discovers and admits that they have a misperception on a certain issue, it doesn\’t actually change their partisan beliefs. \”Fact-checking\” websites have some use, but they can also be another way of expressing partisanship–and those who hold misperceptions most strongly are not likely to be reading fact-checking sites, anyway. Even general warnings about \”fake news\” can backfire. Some research suggests that when people are warned about fake news, they become skeptical of all news, not just part of it. One interesting study warned a random selection of candidates in nine states who were running for office in 2012 that the reputational effects of being called out by fact-checkers could be severe, and found that candidates who received the warnings were less likely to have their accuracy publicly challenged.
Nyhan concludes with this response to suggestions for more severe and perhaps government-based interventions against misperceptions:
Calls for such draconian interventions are commonly fueled by a moral panic over claims that “fake news” has created a supposedly “post-truth” era. These claims falsely suggest an earlier fictitious golden age in which political debate was based on facts and truth. In reality, false information, misperceptions, and conspiracy theories are general features of human society. For instance, belief that John F. Kennedy was killed in a conspiracy were already widespread by the late 1960s and 1970s (Bowman and Rugg 2013). Hofstadter (1964) goes further, showing that a “paranoid style” of conspiratorial thinking recurs in American political culture going back to the country’s founding. Moreover, exposure to the sorts of untrustworthy websites that are often called “fake news” was actually quite limited for most Americans during the 2016 campaign—far less than media accounts suggest (Guess, Nyhan, and Reifler 2020). In general, no systematic evidence exists to demonstrate that the prevalence of misperceptions today (while worrisome) is worse than in the past.
Or as I sometimes say, perhaps the reason for disagreement isn\’t that the other side has been gulled and deceived, and if they just learned the real true facts then they would agree with you. Maybe the most common reason for disagreement is that people actually disagree.
Shifts in How the Fed Perceives the US Economy
For the first time since 2012, the Federal Reserve has updated its \”Statement on Longer-Run Goals and Monetary Policy Strategy,\” and has produced a useful \”Track Changes\” version of the alterations. A set of 12 notes and background papers for these changes is available, too. Perhaps the main substantive change is that the specifies that if inflation has run below its 2% annual target rate for a time, it will then expect inflation to run above that 2% rate for a time. Thus, the Fed\’s 2% annual rate of inflation should not be viewed as an upper bound on the inflation it will allow, but rather as a long-run average. I have nothing against this change, but I strongly suspect that it is not a fix for ails the US economy.
[T]he general level of interest rates has fallen both here in the United States and around the world. Estimates of the neutral federal funds rate, which is the rate consistent with the economy operating at full strength and with stable inflation, have fallen substantially … This rate is not affected by monetary policy but instead is driven by fundamental factors in the economy, including demographics and productivity growth—the same factors that drive potential economic growth. The median estimate from FOMC participants of the neutral federal funds rate has fallen by nearly half since early 2012, from 4.25 percent to 2.5 percent.
As Powell points out, the lower interest rate means that the Fed has less power to stimulate the economy by reducing interest rates–because the interest rate is already closer to zero percent. Powell writes: \”This decline in assessments of the neutral federal funds rate has profound implications for monetary policy. With interest rates generally running closer to their effective lower bound even in good times, the Fed has less scope to support the economy during an economic downturn by simply cutting the federal funds rate.\”
In my own view, these changes in beliefs about the long-run direction of the US economy have at least two main implications. One is that a serious economic agenda for the future needs to focus on how to improve productivity and long-run economic growth. Another is that when (not if) the economy goes bad the next time, the Federal Reserve will be in a weakened position to provide assistance, so thinking in advance about what policies could kick in very quickly seems worth consideration.
What is a "Good Job"?
On the surface, it\’s easy to sketch what a \”good job\” means: having a job in the first place, along with good pay and access to benefits like health insurance. But that quick description is far from adequate, for several interrelated reasons. When most of us think about a \”good job,\” we have more than the paycheck in mind. Jobs can vary a lot in working conditions and predictability of hours. Jobs also vary according to whether the job offers a chance to develop useful skills and a chance for a career path over time. In turn, the extent to which a worker develops skills at a given job will affect whether that worker worker is a replaceable cog who can expect only minimal pay increases over time, or whether the worker will be in a position to get pay raises–or have options to be a leading candidate for jobs with other employers.
A majority of Americans do not consider themselves to be \”engaged\” with their jobs. According to Gallup polling, the share of US workers who viewed themselves as \”engaged\” in their jobs had risen to 35% in 2019, while 52% were \”not engaged\” and 13% were \”actively disengaged.\” One suspects this level of engagement will drop after the pandemic recession.
Oldham and Hackman point out that from the time when Adam Smith described making pins and back in the eighteenth century up through when Frederick W. Taylor led a wave of industrial engineers doing time-and-motions studies of workplace activities in the early 20th century, and up through the assembly line as viewed by companies like General Motors and Ford, the concept of job design focused on the division of labor. In my own view, the job design efforts of this period tended to view workers as robots that carried out a specified set of physical tasks, and the problem was how to make those worker-robots more effective.
Whatever the merits of this view for its place and time, it has clearly become outdated in the last half-century or so. Even in assembly-line work, companies like Toyota that cross-trained workers for a variety of different jobs, including on-the-spot quality control, developed much higher productivity than their US counterparts. And for the swelling numbers of service-related and information-related jobs, the idea of an extreme division of labor, micro-managed at every stage, often seemed somewhere between irrelevant and counterproductive. When worker motivation matters, the question of how to design a \”good job\” has a different focus.
By the 1960s, Frederick Herzberg is arguing that jobs often need to be enriched, rather than simplified. In the 1970s, Oldham and Hackman develop their Job Characteristics Theory, which they describe in the 2010 article like this:
We eventually settled on five ‘‘core’’ job characteristics: Skill variety (i.e., the degree to which the job requires a variety of different activities in carrying out the work, involving the use of a number of different skills and talents of the person), task identity (i.e., the degree to which the job requires doing a whole and identifiable piece of work from beginning to end), task significance (i.e., the degree to which the job has a substantial impact on the lives of other people, whether those people are in the immediate
organization or the world at large), autonomy (i.e., the degree to which the job provides substantial freedom, independence, and discretion to the individual in scheduling the work and in determining the procedures to be used in carrying it out), and job-based feedback (i.e., the degree to which carrying out the work activities required by the job provides the individual with direct and clear information about the effectiveness of his or her performance).
Each of the first three of these characteristics, we proposed, would contribute to the experienced meaningfulness of the work. Having autonomy would contribute to jobholders felt responsibility for work outcomes. And built-in feedback, of course, would provide direct knowledge of the results of the work. When these three psychological states were present—that is, when jobholders experienced the work to be meaningful, felt personally responsible for outcomes, and had knowledge of the results of their work—they would become internally motivated to perform well. And, just as importantly, they would not be able to give themselves a psychological pat on the back for performing well if the work were devoid of meaning, or if they were merely following someone else’s required procedures, or if doing the work generated no information about how well they were performing.
So we incorporated two individual differences into our model—growth need strength (i.e., the degree to which an individual values opportunities for personal growth and development at work) and job-relevant knowledge and skill. Absent the former, a jobholder would not seek or respond to the internal ‘‘kick’’ that comes from succeeding on a challenging task, and without the latter the jobholder would experience more failure than success, never a motivating state of affairs.
It is true that many specific, well-defined jobs continue to exist in contemporary organizations. But we presently are in the midst of what we believe are fundamental changes in the relationships among people, the work they do, and the organizations for which they do it. Now individuals may telecommute rather than come to the office or plant every morning. They may be responsible for balancing among several different activities and responsibilities, none of which is defined as their main job. They may work in temporary teams whose membership shifts as work requirements change. They may be independent contractors, managing simultaneously temporary or semi-permanent relationships with multiple enterprises. They may serve on a project team whose other members come from different organizations—suppliers, clients or organizational partners. They may be required to market their services within their own organizations, with no single boss, no home organizational unit, and no assurance of long-term employment. Even managers are not immune to the changes. For example, they may be members of a leadership team that is responsible for a large number of organizational activities rather than occupy a well-defined role as the sole leader of any one unit or function.
When you start thinking about \”good jobs\” in these broader terms, the challenge of creating good jobs for a 21st century economy becomes more complex. A good job has what economists have called an element of \”gift exchange,\” which means that a motivated worker stands ready to offer some extra effort and energy beyond the bare minimum, while a motivated employer stands ready to offer their workers at all skill levels some extra pay, training, and support beyond the bare minimum. A good job has a degree of stability and predictability in the present, along with prospects for growth of skills and corresponding pay raises in the future. We want good jobs to be available at all skill levels, so that there is a pathway in the job market for those with little experience or skill to work their way up. But in the current economy, the average time spent at a given job is declining and on-the-job training is in decline.
I certainly don\’t expect that we will ever reach a future in which jobs will be all about deep internal fulfillment, with a few giggles and some comradeship tossed in. As my wife and I remind each other when one of us has an especially tough day at the office, there\’s a reason they call it \”work,\” which is closely related to the reason that you get paid for doing it.
But along with a concern for how quickly jobs will return in the aftermath of the pandemic recession, a primary long-term issue in the workforce is how to encourage the economy to develop more good jobs. I don\’t have a well-designed agenda to offer here. But what\’s needed goes well beyond our standard public arguments about whether firms should be required to offer certain minimum levels of wages and benefits.
"The Best Thing for Being Sad is To Learn Something"
As another school year gets underway, I feel moved to speak for the pleasure of learning something, and how learning can banish sadness. The point is more than an academic one for social scientists. There\’s a body of \”happiness\” research, which often looks at things like income, changes in income, political/economic events, health and education levels, life events like parenting or patterns like commuting, and then tries to sort out the connections to \”happiness,\” which is often defined by a response to a survey. The implicit message in this research is often that \”happiness\” is from the ability to consume or from how events (like unemployment or illness) impinge upon us. But sometimes happiness may come not from what we consume or from what happens to us, but from investing in a learning or a new skill.
\”The best thing for being sad,\” replied Merlyn, beginning to puff and blow, \”is to learn something. That is the only thing that never fails. You may grow old and trembling in your anatomies, you may lie awake at night listening to the disorder of your veins, you may miss your only love, you may see the world about you devastated by evil lunatics, or know your honour trampled in the sewers of baser minds. There is only one thing for it then—to learn. Learn why the world wags and what wags it. That is the only thing which the mind can never exhaust, never alienate, never be tortured by, never fear or distrust, and never dream of regretting. Learning is the thing for you. Look at what a lot of things there are to learn—pure science, the only purity there is. You can learn astronomy in a lifetime, natural history in three, literature in six. And then, after you have exhausted a milliard lifetimes in biology and medicine and theo-criticism and geography and history and economics—why, you can start to make a cartwheel out of the appropriate wood, or spend fifty years learning to begin to learn to beat your adversary at fencing. After that you can start again on mathematics, until it is time to learn to plough.\”
\”Apart from all these things,\” said the Wart, \”what do you suggest for me just now?
I always liked Wart\’s down-to-earth and so-very-human rejoinder.
Perhaps the best introduction to the philosophy which I wish to advocate will be a few words of autobiography. I was not born happy. As a child, my favourite hymn was: \’Weary of earth and laden with my sin\’. At the age of five, I reflected that, if I should live to be seventy, I had only endured, so far, a fourteenth part of my whole life, and I felt the long-spread-out boredom ahead of me to be almost unendurable. In adolescence, I hated life and was continually on the verge of suicide, from which, however, I was restrained by the desire to know more mathematics.
Now, on the contrary, I enjoy life; I might almost say that with every year that passes I enjoy it more. This is due partly to having discovered what were the things that I most desired and having gradually acquired many of these things. Partly it is due to having successfully dismissed certain objects of desire – such as the acquisition of indubitable knowledge about something or other – as essentially unattainable. But very largely it is due to a diminishing preoccupation with myself.
Like others who had a Puritan education, I had the habit of meditating on my sins, follies, and shortcomings. I seemed to myself – no doubt justly – a miserable specimen. Gradually I learned to be indifferent to myself and my deficiencies; I came to centre my attention increasingly upon external objects: the state of the world, various branches of knowledge, individuals for whom I felt affection. External interests, it is true, bring each its own possibility of pain: the world may be plunged in war, knowledge in some direction may be hard to achieve, friends may die. But pains of these kinds do not destroy the essential quality of life, as do those that spring from disgust with self. And every external interest inspires some activity which, so long as the interest remains alive, is a complete preventive of ennui. Interest in oneself, on the contrary, leads to no activity of a progressive kind. It may lead to the keeping of a diary, to getting psycho-analysed, or perhaps to becoming a monk. But the monk will not be happy until the routine of the monastery has made him forget his own soul. The happiness which he attributes to religion he could have obtained from becoming a crossing-sweeper, provided he were compelled to remain one. External discipline is the only road to happiness for those unfortunates whose self-absorption is too profound to be cured in any other way. …
When Government Debt Explodes in Size, What Options Do Countries Have?
If federal debt as a percentage of GDP continues to rise at the pace of CBO’s current-law projections, the economy would be affected in two significant ways: Growth in the nation’s debt would dampen economic output over time, and higher interest costs would increase payments to foreign debt holders and thus reduce the income of U.S. households by rising amounts. … High and rising federal debt increases the likelihood of a fiscal crisis because it erodes investors’ confidence in the government’s fiscal position and could result in a sharp reduction in their valuation of Treasury securities, which would drive up interest rates on federal debt because investors would demand higher yields to purchase Treasury securities. … Although no one can predict whether or when a fiscal crisis might occur or how it would unfold, the risk is almost certainly increased by high and rising federal debt. …. In addition, high debt might cause policymakers to feel constrained from implementing deficit-financed fiscal policy to respond to unforeseen events …\”
Throughout history, debt/GDP ratios have been reduced by (i) economic growth; (ii) substantive fiscal adjustment/austerity plans; (iii) explicit default or restructuring of private and/or public debt; (iv) a surprise burst in inflation; and (v) a steady dosage of financial repression accompanied by an equally steady dosage of inflation.
This post is not the place to discuss these choices in any detail. But just to state the obvious, the US economy has not been more prone to slow productivity than to periods of rapid economic growth in recent decades; the US political system has been unwilling to restructure big spending programs like Medicare and Social Security; a large-scale restructuring or default on US debt seems like a highly unlikely last resort; and US inflation has been stuck at low levels for 25 years now, for reasons not fully understood. Thus, I suspect the US economy may be headed, by fits and starts, to a period of what Reinhart and Sbrancia call \”financial repression.\” By this term, they mean a set of policies that invole much greater government management of the financial sector, including policies that focus on keeping interest rates very low and also limit other options available to investors–so that the government will find it easier to keep borrowing at low interest rates.
Have Americans Been Overworking?
There was a time, about 60-70 years ago, when the typical American worker spent several hundred fewer hours on the job each year compared with worked in major European economies. But for the last few decades, American workers now spend several hundred hours more on the job each hear. This shift was not a self-aware political decision. No prominent US political leader advocated that Americans should work more hours than those in other high-income countries. But it has happened, and the question is what might be done about it. Isabel V. Sawhill and Katherine Guyot lay out the background and offer some policy ideas in \”The Middle Class Time Squeeze\” (August 2020, Brookings Institution).
Sawhill and Guyot point out to research showing that that \”legally mandated vacations\” account for about 80% of the gap in annual hours worked between the US and European comparison countries. \”The European Union’s Working Time Directive guarantees 20 paid vacation days per year, and some member states go beyond this requirement, in addition to providing paid holidays.\”
An underlying concern here is that when it comes to hours worked per week or per year, individuals do not make fully free choices, but instead face options shaped by laws and customs. I can\’t \”choose\” additional paid vacation. In most jobs, a US worker can try to negotiate over fewer weekly hours or part-time status, but it\’s likely to be difficult and career-limiting to do so. Sawhill and Guyot write: \”[I]t is unlikely that extensive worktime reductions will come about solely as a result of individual decision-making. Collective changes are needed if as a society we want to work a little less.\”
5) Formalize telecommuting arrangements? \”One employer practice that would help is to formalize work-from-home arrangements and give employees the right to request to work remotely without facing negative employment consequences. In some contexts, this could be good for employers and employees: a growing body of research indicates that telecommuting can improve job satisfaction and raise productivity, in addition to reducing emissions and spreading work to more remote regions.\”
George Orwell: "Vagueness and Sheer Incompetence is the Most Marked Characteristic of Modern English Prose"
Many readers of this blog are surely already familiar with George Orwell\’s famous 1946 essay, \”Politics and the English Language,\” where he makes a case that a \”mixture of vagueness and sheer incompetence is the most marked characteristic of modern English prose.\” Orwell is talking primarily about how, when writing on politics and public affairs, there is apparently an enormous temptation to succumb to crappy writing. He notes:
[A]n effect can become a cause, reinforcing the original cause and producing the same effect in an intensified form, and so on indefinitely. A man may take to drink because he feels himself to be a failure, and then fail all the more completely because he drinks. It is rather the same thing that is happening to the English language. It becomes ugly and inaccurate because our thoughts are foolish, but the slovenliness of our language makes it easier for us to have foolish thoughts.
I am going to translate a passage of good English into modern English of the worst sort. Here is a well-known verse from Ecclesiastes:
I returned and saw under the sun, that the race is not to the swift, nor the battle to the strong, neither yet bread to the wise, nor yet riches to men of understanding, nor yet favour to men of skill; but time and chance happeneth to them all.
Here it is in modern English:
Objective considerations of contemporary phenomena compel the conclusion that success or failure in competitive activities exhibits no tendency to be commensurate with innate capacity, but that a considerable element of the unpredictable must invariably be taken into account.
This is a parody, but not a very gross one. … It will be seen that I have not made a full translation. The beginning and ending of the sentence follow the original meaning fairly closely, but in the middle the concrete illustrations — race, battle, bread — dissolve into the vague phrases ‘success or failure in competitive activities’. This had to be so, because no modern writer of the kind I am discussing — no one capable of using phrases like ‘objective considerations of contemporary phenomena’ — would ever tabulate his thoughts in that precise and detailed way. The whole tendency of modern prose is away from concreteness. Now analyze these two sentences a little more closely. The first contains forty-nine words but only sixty syllables, and all its words are those of everyday life. The second contains thirty-eight words of ninety syllables: eighteen of those words are from Latin roots, and one from Greek. The first sentence contains six vivid images, and only one phrase (‘time and chance’) that could be called vague. The second contains not a single fresh, arresting phrase, and in spite of its ninety syllables it gives only a shortened version of the meaning contained in the first. Yet without a doubt it is the second kind of sentence that is gaining ground in modern English. I do not want to exaggerate. This kind of writing is not yet universal, and outcrops of simplicity will occur here and there in the worst-written page. Still, if you or I were told to write a few lines on the uncertainty of human fortunes, we should probably come much nearer to my imaginary sentence than to the one from Ecclesiastes.
As I have tried to show, modern writing at its worst does not consist in picking out words for the sake of their meaning and inventing images in order to make the meaning clearer. It consists in gumming together long strips of words which have already been set in order by someone else, and making the results presentable by sheer humbug. The attraction of this way of writing is that it is easy.
Later in the essay, Orwell proposes an attractively short list of rules to keep in mind as a writer:
But one can often be in doubt about the effect of a word or a phrase, and one needs rules that one can rely on when instinct fails. I think the following rules will cover most cases:
i. Never use a metaphor, simile, or other figure of speech which you are used to seeing in print.
ii. Never use a long word where a short one will do.
iii. If it is possible to cut a word out, always cut it out.
iv. Never use the passive where you can use the active.
v. Never use a foreign phrase, a scientific word, or a jargon word if you can think of an everyday English equivalent.
vi. Break any of these rules sooner than say anything outright barbarous.
These rules sound elementary, and so they are, but they demand a deep change of attitude in anyone who has grown used to writing in the style now fashionable. One could keep all of them and still write bad English, but one could not write the kind of stuff that I quoted in those five specimens at the beginning of this article.
The Wellspring of Economics: "The Social Enthusiasm which Revolts from the Sordidness of Mean Streets and the Joylessness of Withered Lives "
It is not wonder, but rather the social enthusiasm which revolts from the sordidness of mean streets and the joylessness of withered lives, that is the beginning of economic science.
When a man sets out upon any course of inquiry, the object of his search may be either light or fruit–either knowledge for its own sake or knowledge for the sake of good things to which it leads. … But there will, I think, be general agreement that in the sciences of human society, be their appeal as bearers of light never so high, it is the promise of fruit and not of light that chiefly merits our regard. There is a celebrated, if somewhat too strenuous, passage in Macaulay\’s Essay on History: \”No past event has any intrinsic importance. The knowledge of it is valuable, only as it leads us to form just calculations with regard to the future. A history which does not serve this purpose, though it may be filled with battles, treaties, and commotions, is as useless as the series of turnpike tickets collected by Sir Matthew Mite.
That paradox is partly true. If it were not for the hope that a scientific study of man\’s social actions may lead, not necessarily directly or immediately, but at some time and in some way, to practical results of social improvement, not a few students of these actions would regard the time devoted to their study as time misspent. That is true of all social sciences, but especially true of economics. For economics is \”a study of mankind in the ordinary business of life\”; and it is not in the ordinary business of life that mankind is most interesting or inspiring.
One who desired knowledge of man apart from the fruits of knowledge would seek it in the history of religious enthusiasm, of martyrdom, or of love; he would not seek it in the market-place. When we elect to watch the play of human motives that are ordinary–that are sometimes mean and dismal and ignoble–our knowledge is not the philosopher\’s impulse, knowledge for the sake of knowledge, but rather the physiologist\’s, knowledge for the healing that knowledge may help to bring. Wonder, Carlyle declared, is the beginning of philosophy. It is not wonder, but rather the social enthusiasm which revolts from the sordidness of mean streets and the joylessness of withered lives, that is the beginning of economic science.













