Site icon Conversable Economist

Could Restrictions on Payday Lending Hurt Consumers?

When teaching about price ceilings and price floors, I often toss in a bit about usury laws as an example of a price ceiling. But the usury example never seemed to me very pedagogically effective: it has a whiff of anachronism. A much better example for connecting with students is to discuss payday lending. Kelly Edmiston of the Kansas City Fed raises many of the key issues in: \”Could Restrictions on Payday Lending Hurt Consumers?\”

A payday loan typically involves a borrower writing a check for, say, $200, and then receiving $170. The lender promises not to cash the check for a couple of weeks. As Edmiston says: \”While payday lenders often charge fees rather than interest payments, in effect these charges are interest. Comparing the terms of varying types of loans requires computing an effective, or implied, annual interest rate. For payday loans, this computation is straightforward. A typical payday loan charges $15 per $100 borrowed. If the term of the loan is two weeks, then the effective annual interest rate is 390 percent.\”

Many states have regulated or banned payday loans. \”By the end of 2008, 10 states and the District of Columbia had instituted outright bans on payday lending. Other states have passed regulations that indirectly ban payday lending by making it unprofitable. For example, in Massachusetts, the Small Loan Act Caps interest at 23 percent per year. In states that allow payday lending, regulations may indirectly restrict or effectively ban the practice. A variety of such regulations exists. Most states legislate maximum loan amounts, usually from $300 to $500. The limits that states impose on fees vary widely.\”

The key point for public policy in this area, and a useful theme for teaching about price ceilings and regulation, is that banning or limiting payday lending doesn\’t alter the underlying reasons why people seek out such loans. Restricting payday loans pushes users to other options, which have tradeoffs of their own. For example:

Of course, these tradeoffs don\’t prove that banning or regulating payday loans in various ways is a bad idea. But they do suggest that advocates of regulations need to consider with brutal honesty what is going to happen if payday loans are less available or unavailable.

The lower-risk reforms of payday loans would be to increase information and options. For example, there is a suspicion that for a lot of people, paying 15% on a loan of $100 probably like 15% interest. But of course, a two-week interest rate is not an annualized rate! Requiring more clear information might help. In addition, helping low-income people build a better connection with the banking system, so that they have some flexibility to get short-term liquidity loans through their bank, would probably come at a lower cost than most payday loans. There may also be other options, like emergency assistance programs from the government in certain situations, or advances from employers, or alternative payment plans. Expanding the information and the choice set is often a more reliable way of having a positive result than limiting choices.

For those wishing to get up to speed on payday lending, I can recommend two other useful starting points. One is an article by Michael A. Stegman, \”Payday Lending,\” published in my own Journal of Economic Perspectives in Winter 2007. The other is a useful summary of the evidence in an October 2010 working paper from the Philadelphia Fed from John Caskey, called \”Payday Lending: New Research and the Big Question.\”