The Centre for Economic Policy Research (the one in London, not the one in Washington, DC, as you can see from the spelling of Centre) has a new initiative called “Europe 2050: Geometries of peace, power, and prosperity” The goal is to solicit and collect a bunch of papers–39 of them at my last check–from thoughtful folks about aspects of Europe’s future economics, political, environmental, and foreign policy challenges. The website describes itself this way: “A new initiative led by Olivier Blanchard, Pascal Lamy, Enrico Letta, and CEPR President Beatrice Weder di Mauro adopts a long-term perspective to explore what Europe should aspire to become by 2050. Moving beyond the pressures of short-term crises, the initiative assesses current policy choices against a clearer strategic vision for Europe’s future. The project will generate both longer commissioned policy papers addressing its core themes and shorter pieces published on a rolling basis through an open call. Together, these contributions aim to frame a forward-looking debate on Europe’s long-term economic, political, and strategic future.”
If you are interested in the EU, there’s something here for everyone. Should there be a directly elected president of Europe? Should European countries have less emphasis on public pension systems, and instead pursue a policy of auto-enrolling all citizens in US style contributory retirement accounts? Given that only about 4% of Europeans live outside their country of birth, although there is a legal right to relocate across Europe, what steps are needed for a truly European labor market? How should Europe be reacting to the challenges of AI, by shaping the speed or direction of the technology or with changes to labor markets? How should Europe reshape its immigration policies to focus more not just on how many immigrants will be allowed to enter, but on what terms they will be allowed to enter? And so on and so on.
I found myself especially taken by an essay by Hubert Védrine, a former French Minister of Foreign Affairs, called “Scenarios for Europe in 2050.” He argues that the momentum toward a centralized “United States of Europe” vision has ended, and there are no public demonstrations for “more EU.” On the other side, and especially since Brexit has demonstrated what exit from the EU looks like, there is little public push in any country to leave the EU. The result is a majority of Euro-skeptics–not wanting to dissolve the EU or leave it, but also not pushing for greater uniformity across the EU. He writes:
In my view, these eight decades encompass two distinct periods. I would take as the starting point of the first period American sponsorship in the immediate post-war years (the Marshall Plan and the Alliance), and the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), or, at the latest, the Treaty of Rome in 1957. This first period of European integration, led by “founding fathers” inspired by the revolutionary, anti-Westphalian idea of supranationality, lasted until the rejection in 2005, 21 years ago, of the Constitutional Treaty concluded in 2004. Even before that, as is often forgotten, the Maastricht Treaty had been ratified by referendum in France in 1992 with only one percentage point to spare: 51%. Since then, for some 20 years now, Europe’s governing economic and political elites, pro-European if not committed integrationists, have striven to “move forward” despite that rejection and thanks to the adoption in 2009 of the 2007 Lisbon Treaty. They have done so in the face of numerous obstacles and popular/populist headwinds, constantly denouncing “anti-Europeans” without causing their support to decline. … Throughout these decades and their twists and turns, the most committed pro-Europeans have never stopped advocating supranationality, ignoring General de Gaulle’s ironic prediction: “You cannot make an omelette with hard-boiled eggs” –the hard-boiled eggs being, of course, Europe’s old nations.
There does not appear to be a democratic path to a United States of Europe, not if it requires each of the 27 EU countries to approve of this choice in a popular vote. Indeed, it isn’t obvious that any country has majority support for such a path. Instead, Védrine argues for a
In some areas there would be a shift away from “27 different member-state regimes.” For example, he suggests a legal structure for European-level businesses, unified capital markets, the euro, and a unified response to the challenges of trade with China. But more broadly, the goal would be to give up on the the idea of that the European project is one of ever-closer union, and accept a messier set of future arrangements. He writes:
Abandon all references to federalism, the imperious invocation of “ever closer union”, and even the term “European construction” (it has been going on for too long!). These aspirations are honourable, but they have become mere liturgical formulas. I propose removing them from official discourse without renouncing them. Favour the term “European Political Confederation”, with a federal monetary core, the euro, and make greater geopolitical use of the European Political Community (EPC), a framework consisting only of Europeans and including all Europeans. …Abandon dreams of a “hard core”, since no member state will accept being merely part of the “soft shell” around it. Instead, make greater use of enhanced cooperation, variable geometry, within or outside the EU, projects, flexibility and pragmatism.
It’s a little vague, of course. But as Védrine points out, the evolution of the EU is likely to be driven by events: Russian invasions of other countries, economic crises, the arrival of AI, trade with China, migration, high death tolls during hot summers, and other. Rather than seeking to design a centralized EU political system that would address each of these, the vision instead will be to negotiate shared responses to these issues as they become salient. One can argue, hypothetically, over whether a more centralize dapproach for the EU might be preferable. But I think Védrine has a realistic finger on how the EU could continue to reap benefits of limited but real cooperation.
